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Review
The Crisis of the European Union: A Response
Jürgen Habermas. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2012. 140pp.

Barry Stocker *
A Crisis of the European Union contains the essay “The Crisis of the European Union in
Light of a Constitutionalisation of International Law—An Essay on the Constitution for
Europe,” the second essay “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of
Human Rights,” and an appendix “The Europe of the Federal Republic.” The first essay
is itself divided into three sections: “Why Europe is Now More than Ever a
Constitutional Project”; “The European Union Must Decide between Transnational
Democracy and Post-Democratic Executive Federalism,” and “From the International to
the Cosmopolitan Community.” The second of these sections is itself divided between
five subsections: “Against a Reification of Popular Sovereignty,” “The First Innovation:
The Primacy of Supranational Law Over the National Law of the Monopolists on the
Means for a Legitimate Use of Force,” “The Second Innovation: The Sharing of
Constituting Power between EU Citizens and European Peoples,” “Shared Sovereignty
*
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as the Standard for the Legitimation Requirements of the Union,” and “The Hesitation
of the Political Elites at the Threshold to Transnational Democracy.” The Appendix is
divided between an interview from the newspaper Die Zeit “After the Bankruptcy,” an
essay published in Die Zeit “The Euro Will Decide the Fate of the European Union,”
and an essay published in the newspaper Süddeutschen Zeitung “A Pact for or against
Europe.” An index is sadly lacking, which is surely a loss to the reader even for a short
book of this kind.
The titles and subtitles give a good idea of the scope of the book and the ways
that Habermas tries to integrate his philosophical work with commentary on European
politics. The composition of this short book is to some degree fragmented and accidental,
but it reads as a unified and even continuous piece of writing, with the appendix bringing
the more abstract discussions into a more journalistic context. The good side of this is
that Habermas develops his thoughts on some themes throughout the book. The relative
downside is that there is an element of recapitulating and clarifying what he has already
argued, possibly suggesting some immobility in Habermas’ thought regarding the
European Union and that his framework of thinking about politics, law, and international
community is not the best for thinking about concrete institutions and laws rather than
norms.
Habermas’ advocacy of the European Union is one that appears to be an
extension of his general advocacy for cosmopolitanism at one end and his particular
advocacy for the Federal German constitution at the other end. That is the German
constitution as on object of loyalty is juxtaposed to the European Union on the
cosmopolitan level, where the level of political entity reflects a hierarchy moving up from
national to global through transnational grouping levels. Habermas’ familiar tendency to
put loyalty to laws, courts, and constitutions over issues of national belonging and
identity, or other forms of belonging and identity, might be considered to leave a gap
where there might be a discussion of how individuals come to show some respect and
common interest in political institutions at various levels. The issue of belonging enters
disguised as narratives about courts, constitutions, and so on, which might be a solution,
but only by trying to deal with cannot be fully integrated into Habermas’ own framework.
Habermas’ cosmopolitanism is free of this kind of objection in that
cosmopolitan allegiance and respect for the universal as present in human rights law is
most obviously due to a global understanding and a universal human community of some
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kind, above particularistic loyalties. So cosmopolitanism for Habermas is both the most
abstract part of his account and the most concrete as it is both universal and the most
strongly grounded form of community in his own terms. It fits well into his tendency to
orientate political, legal, and institutional discussions towards pure norms. In a way that
Habermas traces back to Immanuel Kant (62), the world state is understood as a United
Nations reformed so as to be a transnational minarchist entity solely devoted to
preventing violence between states, and the enforcement of human rights (57).
There is a proposal for cosmopolitan democracy that seems unstable since
Habermas both suggests a restricted international nightwatchman function and an elected
world assembly. Elected assemblies have historically shown a strong inclination to
legislate for matters other than those allowed by strict minarchists, so why should we
expect an elected UN assembly (59) to be any different? The minarchist state is a
restriction of the state to judicial and security functions, which would be too narrow in
scope for all the political energy generated by elections and a standing assembly.
Cosmopolitanism is apparently the place where “utopia” of some kind can be
realized, so presumably that is utopia as “eu-topia” rather than “a-topia,” the good place
rather than the non-place. It is still a kind of non-place in that what Habermas refers to is
the pure formalism of the definition and enforcement of human rights law (65), as if this
would have no implication for state sovereignty and state policies other than the
application of a non-political consensus of the basic rights we all have as humans.
There cannot be any completely non-political definition of human rights with
no implications for policy and laws concerned with the general welfare, though
Habermas asserts there can be (65) even if the idea of human rights as something above
politics is already widely accepted and often serves some good purpose. Indeed,
Habermas’ own discussion a few pages later (86–88) contains an interesting exploration
of the ways that particularistic rights become universal formal rights, which then spill
over into at least the beginnings of the more substantive issues of public policy. Human
rights are going to be defined in ways which are more or less favorable to different
visions of distributive justice and individual rights, and these choices must make
differences with regard to the more detailed areas of law and the activities of government.
The utopia of cosmopolitan human rights will necessarily be involved in the not
so utopian kind of political debates around these issues, and political debates mean
broader tradeoffs and alliances around issues, which it is difficult to classify as pure
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human rights concerns. The reader may reasonably conclude that Habermas has some
views about where human rights discussion tends to lead and that is that it leads towards
a kind of post-liberal and post-Marxist society with a very proceduralist democracy with
a very flat distribution of economic goods. From Habermas’ point of view that should all
flow from a properly constituted discussion of norms, rights, and the like, in the hope of
political institutions without the less ideal looking parts of politics.
His favored antagonist in this issue is Carl Schmitt, who stands in for the more
relativized and conflictual aspects of politics at various points. Schmitt might be
considered as an excessively convenient choice of opponent given his appalling political
decision to join the Nazis in 1933 and his enduring authoritarian-traditionalist tendencies.
Nevertheless, his thought has been taken up productively by those with much more liberal,
democratic, and cosmopolitan inclinations, something Habermas overlooks here, and in
general Habermas could have taken up less obviously tainted opponents on this issue,
such as Hannah Arendt or Michel Foucault, for a more constructive encounter.
Moving to the German national level, Habermas on the detail of his argument
does have a bit more than pure austere loyalty to constitutions to offer as a source of
allegiance. There is some sense of national narrative that includes the medieval German
Empire (the Holy Roman Empire) and nineteenth-century struggles for a Germany both
democratic and unified (74), and a hint of national competitiveness with the United States,
when he emphasizes that the German constitutional court does not permit any policy of
shooting down hijacked passenger planes, for reasons that Habermas presents as
distinctly Kantian. There is a distinct air of showing the equivalence and even superiority
of Germany’s highest legal instance in comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court, with
regard to the sanctity of life and general normative commitments.
There is also a distinct air of thinking of the European Union as a larger version
of Federal Germany, and the precedents for Federal Germany as in the confederal nature
of the old Holy Roman Empire (at least after a decline in the power of the medieval
Emperors), as leading the way to the European Union. It would be harsh to say that
Habermas consciously promotes the idea of a Europe modelled on Germany, and his
emphasis on a transnational democracy that is not a federation is one way of distancing
himself from the idea, but nevertheless it could be said that this is a background
assumption. To some degree the background assumption is there because it has some
reality to it. Charlemagne was known in his own time, and since as “Rex Pater Europae”
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and at least during the period when the Holy Roman Empire gave German sovereigns
effective rule over significant parts of Italy, the Empire was a kind of mini-Europe.
The structure of the Holy Roman Empire, after the central power of the
Emperors was eroded, was something like a multi-national confederacy. Even the
constitution of the Second Empire had some aspects of such a structure in a territory
covering parts of what is now France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Russia, Lithuania, and
the Czech Republic, as well as the current German state. The idea of a pan-European
political structure has other sources, but the most obvious one is the idea of a universal
French monarchy which has roots in the Frankish Charlemagne. The medieval German
“Holy Roman” Empire was itself a kind of revival of the pan-European sovereignty
represented in approximate manner by the Roman Empire.
Habermas is not engaged in a general history of Germany and Europe, so there
is no expectation that he should cover this kind of history. The problem is that he does on
occasion allude to it without being able to integrate it into his account of a European
political project. The answer to questions about this issue is likely to be that of norms,
given practical significance by some European legal decisions (25–26) that Habermas
emphasizes have superseded the issue of Germany’s role, or at least show the way to
superseding Germany’s role. Habermas gives enough importance to the role of Germany
in Europe to criticize Angela Merkel (52) for an apparent lack of vision in reaction to the
crisis of the Eurozone, but she could only achieve the necessary vision either through
reducing Germany’s capacity to lead through a more federalized (in the sense of
centralized) management of the Euro, and associated fiscal issues, which in effect is
Habermas’ preferred option or through a more explicitly German led Europe, which is not
what Habermas argues for, but might be taken as necessary in the foreseeable future in
any activist response of the EU to the Eurozone crisis, or any other issue.
Habermas prefers to talk about transnational democracy (ix) rather than
federalism with regard to the European Union, but transnational democracy recognizing
both citizens as individuals and peoples as collective entities, looks very much like what
most would describe as federalism, in that sovereignty is shared between constituting
entities and an overarching entity. The phrase “transnational democracy” is very much in
danger of looking like an evasion of the issue of how to legitimate some passing of
sovereignty to the transnational structures mentioned.
The question of Europe is from the beginning of the book a question of
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Germany, as Habermas’ preface suggests a crisis of the “ordoliberal” model of economic
stability (vii) during the recent Euro crisis and associated international Great Recession.
The “ ordoliberal” model refers to the economic policies adopted by the founders of the
Federal

Republic, which mix a market oriented economy with strong welfare

commitments. The nature of this has changed over time, but it is still recognizably part of
a German consensus which has so far survived the Euro crisis. To some degree is must be
objectionable to Habermas, since it does not correspond to his desire for a radical
lessening of economic inequality and unregulated economic activity, in what is
approximately speaking a program for Marxist goals through liberal means. The problem
for Habermas is that his assumptions about the normative ideals present in discourse, and
the impact that their ideal expression in human rights laws will have are not fulfilled as
the norms in Germany have remained broadly “ordoliberal” despite the commitment to
human rights and constitutionalism emphasized by Habermas, and the impact of crises in
the financial markets.
The writing in the book is formed by a suspicion or hope that the Euro crisis of
2009, particularly in the context of the American centered, but global crisis of 2007,
would destabilize the German-European consensus around welfarist regulatory capitalism
and the persistence of an inter-state aspect to the structure of the European Union. The
suspicion for Habermas is that a populist right will push sovereigntist and protectionist
impulses in ways that will produce a Europe with a weakened EU composed of mutually
suspicious nationalist states. The hope is that forces to the left of the existing consensus,
untainted by the most illiberal aspects of Marxism will produce an egalitarian, democratic,
federalist Europe of nations willing to reduce or give up sovereign powers.
Perhaps the real issue for Habermas is a move away from the hope of 1989, at
least from Habermas’ point of view, with regard to the end of communism and the
prospect of a Europe transformed by integration of ex-communist countries into the EU
on a liberal democratic, legalistic, and welfarist basis, which respects the authority of
human rights and transnational institutions. In that respect, Habermas’s book was and is
timely.
Habermas’ place in these tensions with regard to the European project is
thoroughly ambiguous in that he is both hoping for tensions to appear that will be
resolved by a kind of radicalization of left-liberalism and transnational integration, while
also hoping for the endurance of current embedded institutions and policies to protect
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what there is in the way of democracy, welfarism, and supranational institutions. A Crisis
of the European Union shows some of the greatness of Habermas’ intellectual
achievements as far as is possible in the approachable kind of writing gathered here, and
its usefulness in thinking about current political situations, while also betraying
uncertainty about how to respond to recent events, how far they can be analyzed from his
own rationalist-consensualist point of view, and how far his own political interpretation
of that framework is likely to prevail. A good book for thinking about the strengths and
limits of Habermas’ achievements in a concise contained way.

